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IN HONOR OF MAN

THE attempt to get at the meaning of Buddhism, or what Gautama taught, should hold a particular attraction for the thoughtful Westerner. In the first place, Buddhism, although a religion with doctrines, is not essentially a "doctrinal" religion. Rather, as Irving Babbitt notes in the essay, "Buddha and the Occident," accompanying his translation of the *Dhammapada*, Buddhism is a *path* or a *way*. The average Westerner expects to find rigid doctrines or dogmas in religion. He will not find them in Buddhism, and this may be a refreshing discovery. Babbitt comments:

> The comparative absence of dogma in the humanism of Confucius and the religion of Buddha can scarcely be regarded as an inferiority. On the contrary one can at least see the point of view of a young Chinese scholar, Mr. H. H. Chang, who complains that the man of the Occident has introduced unnecessary theological and metaphysical complications into religion: he has been too prone to indulge in "weird dogmas" and "uncanny curiosity." He has been guilty to a degree unknown in the Far East of intolerance, obscurantism, and casuistry. Pascal, one of the most profound of religious thinkers, attacked casuistry in its Jesuitical form but himself supplies an example of what Mr. Chang means by weird dogmas. Man, says Pascal in substance, is unintelligible to himself without the belief in infant damnation.

The average Westerner may argue, with justice, that *he* does not believe in infant damnation, but he will find it less easy to explain what he does believe in. The point, here, is that the West, having inherited a practically unbelievable religion—unbelievable, at least, in its most clearly defined forms of orthodoxy, and becoming credible only as indifference to doctrine progresses—having an unbelievable religion, the West attempts to manage without any real religion at all. This results in a rather serious absence of any profound tradition of wisdom for the Westerner to turn to, when he is in need of understanding.

The interesting thing about Buddhism is its applicability to so many of the complexities of modern life. Take for example the puzzling situation of the United States, so manifestly a "progressive" type of civilization, yet confused and bewildered almost beyond measure by the problems which the West has created for itself. Here, again, we shall allow Mr. Babbitt to speak in behalf of Eastern tradition, applying its comprehensive analysis to Western culture. In this passage, Babbitt is discussing the question of responsibility for the outbreak of the first great war of this century. He writes:

> Nearly everyone, for example, who was concerned with the outbreak of the Great War has been proclaiming his blamelessness and at the same time pointing an accusing finger at someone else. We shall discover perhaps even more unedifying aspects of human nature than this search for scapegoats if we probe this whole question of war and peace by a Buddhistic method; if, in other words, we envisage it from the point of view of the inner life and then deal with the inner life positively and critically, in the opposition it offers between the principle of control and the expansive desires. According to an ancient Sanskrit epigram the uncultivated man and the thoroughly cultivated man are alike in having few and simple desires; the man who has reached the stage of half-way knowledge, on the other hand, is insatiable. Precisely this type of insatiableness has appeared in the modern man who has become too critical to accept the traditional controls but not critical enough to achieve new ones. In tracing the process by which in our modern period the principle of control in human nature has been weakened in favor of a sheer expansiveness one needs to attend carefully to the fortunes of the doctrine with which this principle has been traditionally associated—the doctrine of divine grace. An important aspect of the sentimental movement has been primitivism. The primitivist inclines to look for goodness not to the grace of God but to the grace of nature. Instead of the inner workings of the spirit on which both Christian and Buddhist put so much emphasis, he proclaims a "wise passiveness." The utilitarian, representing the other chief aspect of the modern movement, has obscured the truths of the higher will in the Christian or any other form, by his tendency to transfer action from the inner life to the outer world, or to put a material in place of a spiritual efficiency. One can trace this development with special clearness among Protestants, notably perhaps among Calvinists. Calvin granted to God so much and to man so little in his scheme of salvation that his followers inclined to turn their efforts from the inner life where they seemed to be of no avail to the outer world, and then, in the type of prosperity achieved by this kind of working, to see a sign that they were in the divine favour. This development has rightly received attention from those

who have studied the rise of modern capitalism with its exaltation of the acquisitive life.

What is notable, here, is the fact that in Buddhism, or in a Sanskrit epigram, Mr. Babbitt found a basis for analysis which enabled him to go on to a searching examination of life in the West. He was of course a remarkable thinker on his own account, and it would be a mistake to assume that his "light" is a borrowed one, yet his lifetime's study of Buddhism should certainly be recognized.

The need of the West, obviously, is for some critical and analytical position which is *outside* the circle of Western assumptions about good and evil, right and wrong, truth and error. Babbitt obviously found a position of this sort in Buddhism.

To apply the analogy of the Sanskrit epigram further, there seems to be at least a possibility that the West is approaching the point where it may become inwardly troubled by its "insatiableness" and its hope of salvation through outward achievement. From the moralist's point of view, this would mean simply a transition toward a culture in which men would have "few and simple desires." From the viewpoint of theories about man, and social doctrines, however, such a transition holds the potentiality of several kinds of revolution. To raise the ideal of "few and simple desires" is practically subversive of the credo of modern business and its allied cult of sales promotion. As Babbitt puts it:

> Material comfort has come more and more to seem to the modern man a satisfying substitute for spiritual comfort. To be sure, one does not know what secret qualms may torture the modern man or at least an occasional modern man as he is whirled he knows not whither in an ever-increasing mass of interlocking machinery. To all outer appearances, however, most men no longer crave the security and serenity which are of the essence of religious comfort and have allowed these terms, like the term comfort itself, to be appropriated by the utilitarians. An American life insurance company recently advertised as follows: "Buddha, who was born a prince, gave up his name, succession and his heritage to attain security. But . . . we do not have to give up the world; we have only to see a life insurance agent who can sell us security for the future, the most direct step to serenity of mind."

We live, in short, in a world where sagacious advertising men obtain permission to spend large sums of their client's money to say things of this sort to the public, in the expectation that they will not be laughed at, but, on the contrary, will be accepted!

A society informed by Buddhist philosophy would find a claim of this sort absolutely ridiculous. We do not mean to suggest that we can point to some country where Buddhism is the dominant religion, and show this elevated outlook on life to be a reality. As a matter of fact, the East has been so beguiled by Western military prowess and material prosperity that in many oriental lands the people are rapidly embracing Western standards of living as the goal of their existence. But this means only that the East also needs to hearken to Buddhist wisdom.

This discussion of Buddhism was originally provoked by a review copy of *The Dhammapada*, a new English translation by Narada Maha Thera, of Ceylon, published by the Maha Bodhi Society of India (4A, Bankim Chatterjee Street, Calcutta). The Buddha, as is generally known, wrote nothing, and the *Dhammapada* is said to be an authentic record of his moral teachings to his disciples, who placed them of record. There are several English translations of this work in print, and there will doubtless be many more. It seems to us that any number of translations, if readable, are all to the good, for each will help to draw the attention of the West to this extraordinary collection of Buddhist precepts. One hopes, too, that the *Dhammapada* will be read in the West, not as a relic of some ancient religion, but as a treatise on human nature. Simple justice requires the recognition that Buddha's approach is made in a scientific spirit. Babbitt is especially good on this point:

> Buddha. . . differs from the religious teachers with whom we are familiar by his positive temper. The idea of experiment and the idea of the supernatural have come to seem to us mutually exclusive. Yet Buddha may perhaps be best defined as a critical and experimental supernaturalist. If he deserves to be thus defined it is not because of the so-called magic powers *(iddhi)*—the power of supernormal memory, of levitation and the like. If we accepted only a small part of what we read in the ancient records about the thaumaturgical accomplishments not merely of Buddha but of a number of his followers, we should have to conclude that man has certain psychic capacities that have become atrophied through long disuse. In general, however, the ancient Buddhist maintained an extreme reserve in regard to magic powers. He granted them at most a very subordinate role in religion. He is far removed in this respect from a Pascal who avowed, like St. Augustine

> before him, that he would not have accepted Christianity had it not been for its miracles.

There are other distinctive ways in which Buddha's teachings are set off from the Christian tradition. The Buddhist may turn to Buddha for an example of excellence in human behavior, but the Buddhist must save himself. "God," as a person, or even as a separate or distinctive "force," has no place in Buddhist philosophy. In practice, Buddhism is a discipline undertaken to arouse the will and to subdue desire. This, according to the Buddhist tradition, is the practical meaning of "liberation." It is an end pursued by practice of the virtues and obtained through self-control and self-understanding. Attainment, in Buddhist terms, is the result of serious work. As the first, often-quoted verses of the *Dhammapada* declare:

> 1. Mind is the fore-runner of all evil conditions. Mind is chief; and they are mind-made. If, with an impure mind, one speaks or acts, then pain follows one even as the wheel, the hoof of the ox.
>
> 2. Mind is the fore-runner of all good conditions. Mind is chief; and they are mind-made. If, with a pure mind, one speaks or acts, then happiness follows one even as the shadow that never leaves.

The aphorisms of the *Dhammapada* are nuclear thoughts to live with. In these "twin verses" may be found an entire moral psychology and a theory of causation in human experience. Salvation, in Buddhist terms, is a transaction completed by the individual with his mind, by the accumulation of knowledge, or by penetration to knowledge. The "heart doctrine" of Buddhism never becomes a foe of hard thinking. Babbitt says:

> The conflict between the head and the heart, the tendency to repudiate the intellect either in the name of what is above or what is below it, which has played such an enormous role in the Occident from some of the early Christians to Bergson, is alien to genuine Buddhism. The supreme illumination of Buddha was associated with the precise tracing of cause and effect, with the following out of the so-called causal nexus. His discriminating temper appears in the care with which he uses general terms, always a crucial point in any doctrine. He gives one the impression of a person who has worked out his ideas to the ultimate degree of clarity, a clarity that is found not merely in separate propositions but in the way in which they are woven into an orderly whole. . . . This firm intellectual grasp, joined to a dominant and unwavering purpose, no doubt contributed to the effect of authority that he produced upon his contemporaries and continues to produce upon us.

In reading the words of the Buddha, then, one is able to feel that he is encountering the work of another human being. This is almost a unique experience, in respect to the great religious scriptures in respect to the great religious scriptures afforded by the world, most of which speak in the name of divinity itself. A Buddhist, perhaps, would rejoin that Buddha, too, speaks in the name of divinity, since he represents in a realized state the divinity inherent in every human being. In any event, we may note that Buddhism, which is the most demanding of religions with respect to what is required of the individual, is at the same time the religion which honors the human being the most, and offers a future which would make of every man a veritable god—that is, a Buddha.

Letter from GERMANY

FRANKFORT ON THE MAIN.—When living as a refugee from the Soviet zone of Germany in a Western barracks camp, one feels deeply moved by the latest developments at East Berlin and the surrounding country during recent months. But this strong interest stands, unfortunately, quite in contrast to the general attitude of the common Western German inhabitant, who usually pays little attention to the fact that his compatriots in the Soviet occupation zone went out on the street and demonstrated with bare hands against their government and Russian tanks. The reasons for this passive attitude may come from the purely commercial interest in one's own affairs—the struggle for existence is hard, of course—and the bitter knowledge, too, acquired by harsh experience, that all politically important problems today are—or rather, were, up to now—not solved by masses on the street, but by diplomatic and other actions of a few big world powers.

There is certainly a great deal of truth in this passive attitude, yet this truth seems to be fading away fast with forthcoming events. When analysing Eastern upheavals and the further spread of unrest behind the "iron curtain," it seems quite intelligible that the period of mass silence which began in 1933 is coming to its end—and this not only in Germany. One might even foresee a general ferment of people all over the world, for the present difficulties of the Soviets are the future difficulties of the Western powers, springing from the same root: *utter disregard for important human needs and wants.* (We live in *one* world; this truth is evident.) One can understand the uneasy attitude of Western powers which—like the government of the Western Bundesrepublik itself—has done little to assist the rebellion in the Soviet region. No slogans were given out, no actual support took place. (This seems in striking similarity to the past attitude of the Allied Powers toward the resistance movement in Germany against Hitler.)

Contradictory as this policy may appear—encouraging general resistance, but drawing back, should it finally reach the stage of open resurrection—it has its deeper meaning as the fright felt before forces which, once let loose, cannot be bound. (See for this Goethe's poem, *Der Zauberlehrling—The Sorcerer's Apprentice.)* The actual difference between the present and the last years of the Hitler regime lies in the fact that the pressure of embargoes and other restrictions against Soviet-ruled countries has roused so much bitterness among the enslaved people against their rulers that for the first time in modern history it was shown that dictatorship is not invincible, but deeply vulnerable from within, when there is help from the outside. The Soviet Union has already lost the armament race since Korea's bloody spectacle began. We have evidence today of the crumbling and the weaknesses of the Soviet system. The uprisings may be quelled, but mass opposition will remain.

It seems immoral to your correspondent to regard the actions of Soviet-ruled populations as only giving to non-Soviet powers a better position at a conference table. This is only one aspect of the heroic happenings in the East. The justice of history will probably punish that immorality with consequences that will be seen later on.

Another prospect for men with developed consciousness and perspective of mind has to be mentioned: The world of ideas and its impulses will eventually change, when general social activity reaches a world-wide scale. When the "cemetery peace"—unbearable in Germany since 1933—ends, new outlooks will be found to lead to a better life and organisation of society.

GERMAN CORRESPONDENT

REVIEW
ALONG THE POTOMAC

THE POTOMAC, by Frederick Gutheim, is one of forty books published by Rinehart & Co. about American rivers. Lest anyone should suppose that *The Potomac* is a pleasant naturalist's account of one of the great American waterways, we hasten to say that this book is very largely about the people who have lived in the Potomac Valley, from the earliest colonial times, and how they nourished the roots of the American republic. Actually, Mr. Gutheim's effective description of the role of Potomac Valley men in the making of the United States renews a challenge which has often been formulated in these pages, making some notice of his book inevitable. A central theme of the author is the part played by one George Mason, a planter of Alexandria, Virginia, in shaping the political ideals of the United States and in giving voice to New World conceptions of political philosophy. It is the balance and at the same time the fervor of a man like Mason which compel the reader's attention; it is the union of practical sagacity with the rejection of any sort of moral compromise an association as rare as it is distinguished—which invites some wonderment at the generation which flourished during the revolutionary epoch of the eighteenth century.

These men were fired to action by ideals which we merely respect. These men sacrificed much of their fortune in order to serve principles which, today, are widely interpreted as means to greater or at least more secure fortune. The eighteenth-century view of man as "free and equal" was no cliché of the political market place it was to the men who held it a high and shining beacon by which they guided their lives.

The "challenge" we spoke of is this: What idea is capable of stirring the man of today as eighteenth-century men were stirred by their ideals? A book which obliges us to reflect upon this question is a useful book, and if Mr. Gutheim does not demand that we make this comparison, the material for it cries out for attention in *The Potomac*.

Gutheim sketches the life of Mason in a few hundred words. Mason's father died in a sailboat crossing the Potomac, and the youth was reared by his mother and a lawyer uncle, John Mercer, whose library of fifteen hundred books was the foundation of Mason's education. Mason became a farmer who managed his own plantation. While he thought of himself as a private citizen, "he performed all those local offices that the ambitious and rising often look upon with contempt." His formal political career, however, was quite brief, being marked by the sole success of learning how to sleep through the dull debates in the House of Burgesses at Williamsburg. His influence was rather among small gatherings of citizens. A paragraph sums up his career:

> Remembered fondly in Virginia for his authorship of the Virginia Bill of Rights, Mason was far more than a brilliant provincial figure. His mind ran to large designs and broad principles. He never compromised and, although decades often passed, his judgments generally proved correct. Even his objections to the Constitution of the United States were subsequently recognized, as the Bill of Rights and various early amendments demonstrated. Perhaps his greatest achievement was moral: he condemned the constitutional quibble that later led to the Civil War, and opposed the spread of slavery to the western states, freed his own slaves, stood for emancipation and education of the Negroes. . . . Opposition to slavery was the backbone of Mason's celebrated objection to the Federal Constitution.

The story of what happened to the private fortunes of the Virginia patriots is worthy of note. Actually, while most of them were men of substance, they lived in a period of rapid decline of the tobacco economy. Gutheim puts it:

> Before the Revolution, Councillor Carter and his wife studied their accounts and discovered that "the plantations were earning at a rate so low that the value of the slaves alone if liquidated and lent out would have brought a greater income on interest." This was the first clear fissure that later widened to a chasm that engulfed all of the great plantations. At Washington's death that careful farmer's estate at

> Mount Vernon was in ruins. "No Virginia estate," he wrote, "can stand simple interest." George Mason would have been unable to attend the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia had not his expenses been paid by the state of Virginia. Madison tried vainly to get a loan from the United States Bank and was forced to sell his land and stocks and capital to meet his debts. Even Jefferson had financial embarrassments. Monroe found himself financially mined when he left the White House. That half-crazy prophet of secession, John Randolph of Roanoke, predicted that masters would soon run away from their slaves and be advertised by them in the press. Decay was everywhere in Tidewater Potomac as the eighteenth century ended.

No one really interested in the problems of the modern world can avoid the study of the great revolutions which have wracked the West ever since the decline of the feudal system. And after one has studied these social cataclysms, he is likely to conclude that they are curiously compounded of nobility and disaster. Probably the most important criticism of revolution, as a process, has come from men like Irving Babbitt, in his strictures on Rousseau, which are effectively repeated by Everett Dean Martin in *Farewell to Revolution.* The American Revolution, however, was both noble and relatively disasterless. It had no noticeable neurotic twist. Its engineers were not wild utopians, not disappointed or angry "have-nots," but men in whom a full measure of maturity was unable to quell the ardor of intense belief in principle. Perhaps, in these parlous times, we should return to the study of the American Revolution, to discover once again its essence.

In 1774, George Mason presented at the Fairfax County Courthouse a set of resolutions which became known as the Fairfax Resolves. These resolutions attack the legality of the Navigation Acts, maintaining that the British Crown had no right to shape for the purposes of the mercantile system the economic life of the colonies. Mason was conciliatory but unequivocal. Declaring that "Taxation and representation are in their nature inseparable," Mason went on to propose a "firm union" of the colonies and an embargo on British trade. A year later he drafted the plan for the first colonial militia, commanded by George Washington. The uniforms of this body became the garb of the Continental Army. At this time the ringing idealism of the eighteenth century emerged in Mason's expression:

> "We came equals into this world," Mason told his military audience, "and equals we shall go out of it. All men are by nature born equally free and independent." Just as men give up some of their natural rights to create governments capable of ensuring others' rights, so it becomes necessary to give some individuals the power to command others. How, he inquired, can these militia officers be prevented from becoming despots? He answered: "The most effectual means that human wisdom hath ever been able to devise, is frequently appealing to the body of the people, to those constituent members from whom authority originated, for their approbation or dissent."

These ideas were further developed in Mason's draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was adopted by the Virginia Legislature with hardly a change. Then, Gutheim tells us:

> With the Virginia Bill of Rights in his hand, the following month in his Philadelphia lodging house, Thomas Jefferson, with his "happy talent of composition, was writing: "We hold these truths to be self-evident," . . . The language was that of Jefferson, but the ideas are those which Mason had written into the Virginia Bill of Rights, the thoughts that stem from a county resolution and a speech to a local militia company. They were the ideas of the Potomac region, of its planters, its merchants, and its frontiersmen.
>
> Mason's genius was his power to generalize. He extracted the golden universal truths from the common clay of particular experiences. His gift was tempered by a profound knowledge and respect of the common law, and the long history of Virginia's colonial government; and by his diligent reading of the political philosophers of the seventeenth-century revolution in England and the works of John Locke. Drenched, like all of his generation, in classical culture, he was yet alive to the burning issues of the present.

While Alexandria celebrated the signing of the Constitution, Mason sat in depression,

revolted that the charter seemed to permit "a few rich merchants in Philadelphia, New York and Boston" to achieve monopoly over the farmer's staple crops, and disgusted that the importation of slaves was to continue for twenty years. He had not signed the Constitution.

We may conclude this discussion, which began as an examination of Mason's principles, but ends as an appreciation of a relatively unknown man, with a quotation from his will:

> I recommend it to my sons from my own experience in life, to prefer the happiness of independence and a private station to the troubles and vexation of publick business, but if either their own inclinations or the necessity of the times should engage them in public affairs, I charge them on a father's blessing never to let the motives of private interests or ambition induce them to betray, nor the fear of danger or death, deter them from asserting the liberty of their country and endeavoring to transmit to their posterity those sacred rights to which themselves were born.

COMMENTARY
PROGRESS REPORT

THE MANAS PACKAGE PROJECT, inaugurated informally three months ago, has now prepared for shipment to South Africa a total of forty-six parcels. (This is in addition to the packages of food and clothing sent by the editorial staff to friends and contributors in other lands.)

As a commentary on the system by which the world we live in is run, we here take note of the fact that the twenty-five packages prepared for mailing in the last meeting-night of the project (Sept. 5), will require postage totalling some sixty-six dollars in order for them to reach their destination. We are incidentally reminded by this unpleasant statistic of Ralph Borsodi's claim that the cost of distribution consistently destroys the economic advantages gained by mass production methods (see *Flight from the City)*, and are once again impressed by the arguments of the decentralists.

But even the best of schemes for reforming economic production and distribution are no help in this present situation. The fact is that the South Africans are unable to feed themselves properly from the land available to them, and are unable to earn enough money to do so in the factories and mines owned by the white rulers of the Union of South Africa. Meanwhile, those in other parts of the world who want to help the Africans are obliged to observe postal regulations such as the eleven-pound limit on all packages, and must pay for stamps which mount rapidly to a serious cost item whenever clothing and other things are gathered by a group.

So far, without any special solicitation, we have received three contributions of ten dollars and three of five dollars to help meet the postage bill. In addition to this, one subscriber has been giving ten dollars a month for this purpose. (We should add, here, that not a great deal more is needed to cover mailing costs, since postal regulations also limit the number of packages which may be sent each week by any individual or organization.)

A letter from a grateful African student who received a single, long-sleeved white shirt from one of the packages tells how his university fees are paid by a group, not relatives, in his home community in the British Protectorate of Nyasaland. This youth will receive his degree as Bachelor of Science this year and then return to help his people, after years spent in South Africa to obtain an education.

CHILDREN
. . . and Ourselves

THE 1952 Ballantine printing of John Bartlow Martin's investigation of conditions leading to teen-age murder, entitled *Why Did They Kill?,* reminds us that letters from our subscribers have shown more interest in "delinquency" than in any other subject. All who have this interest, should, it strikes us, become acquainted with this book, whose author is an able reporter and also one of the better amateur sociologists. A portion of the material used in *Why Did They Kill?* was first published in the *Satevepost,* and in both places Martin avoids sensationalism, even though the facts he had to work with could easily have been exploited in this way.

On Sept. 15, 1951, a nurse from an Ann Arbor (Mich.) hospital was killed by an eighteen-year-old boy's irrational, unpremeditated assault. The youth was of "good parentage and background" and possessed no apparent motivation for the crime. The killing was witnessed and implicitly condoned by two of the killer's young friends. From this point Martin sets out to investigate life among the teen-agers in Ann Arbor and in the adjoining town of Ypsilanti, summing up with the opinion—a rather frightening one—that *no* single cause was responsible for the crime, and that, in our society, similarly senseless brutalities will occasionally be perpetrated by the most unlikely candidates whenever the trend towards violence becomes a norm among disoriented youth. As Mr. Martin puts it:

> Stated in the simplest terms this murder occurred because two factors came together—a psychopathic individual and a delinquent society. Psychiatry is unable to give us much help on individual psychopathy. Can no one help much on society? Evidently not. Our study of these boys' world has uncovered a considerable amount of juvenile delinquency. Yet most civic leaders in Ann Arbor and Ypsilanti agree on one thing if on nothing else: That there is not more juvenile delinquency in their towns than in most towns. If this is true then adult Americans have little notion of what their children are up to—and this is by no means unlikely.

The effect of war-dislocated homes and the feverish excitement of mobilization was made statistically apparent during the "mid-war" year of 1943, when delinquency increased 40 per cent above the pre-war average. The general opinion in 1946 was that this was simply one of the unfortunate immediate results to be expected from a war-involved society, and in that year a slight decrease in arrests for juvenile crimes seemed to bear out the predicted expectation of improvement, even though the number of delinquents still exceeded the pre-war average by approximately 40 per cent. In 1948, however, it was disturbingly apparent that a vast trend towards increase of crime was in progress and could not be accounted for entirely by the war. As one statistician summed up the crime wave:

> In 1948 and the first six months of 1949 it appeared to exceed pre-war levels by a solid fifty percent. Further, the youngest group of offenders, those below the age of fourteen, once more is showing the increases characteristic of the war period, exceeding the old averages by from five to thirty percent in cities across the country.
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> These younger delinquents of today are a strange, cold crew, often vicious where their predecessors were merely adventurous. One Child Guidance Bureau psychiatric worker in New York attributes their rise to the same social upheavals which spawned so many child offenders during the war.
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> "Those disturbances also affected parents, and through them were passed onto the crop of infants at the time. Now the infants have matured, with the disturbances ripening into delinquent behavior."
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> With the growth of these saplings, delinquency seems again to be climbing on every police graph. Definitive figures are lacking, but the trend is unmistakable. Child-gang warfare flourishes in our big cities and some of the smaller ones. Again newspapers and national magazines are running sensational articles on the sins and vices of youth. Alarmed warnings come from pulpits; courts and welfare departments from coast to coast plead for greater public efforts to stem the growing scourge. And one New York police official sadly shakes his

> head as he tells the press, "It was bad enough during the war—but we've never seen anything like this!" What is the answer? No single or absolute solution exists.

In the Ann Arbor case, the witless and apparently unwitting murder of the young nurse led police to think that they were after a "maniac." Mr. Martin here points out that this obvious—and incorrect—conclusion highlights the psychological background of a problem far more distressing than would have been the case if Bill Morey, the killer, *had* been definitely psychotic, or had had a criminal record. Bill did have psychotic *tendencies*, but so do a large number of young men and women. Bill had been drinking heavily that evening, but so have innumerable teen-agers on every evening of the year. Bill Morey did *not* answer to the description of "maniac." As Mr. Martin sums it up:

> The police were greatly surprised when, a few days after the murder, a young man from the neighboring town of Ypsilanti told them that three lads he knew had committed it—Bill Morey, Max Pell, and Dave Royal. This seemed hard to believe. These boys were seventeen or eighteen years old. They had no felony records. They came from good families. Their parents were respected citizens. . .
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> The police picked them up. They were nice-looking boys, well-spoken, mannerly, neat, clean-cut, straightforward. They confessed the murder. Bill Morey had actually slugged the nurse. Max Pell had driven the car. Dave Royal had helped drag the body.
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> The boys' parents were aghast. One, Bill Morey's father, no doubt spoke for all that night, when he told a newspaper reporter: "I can't believe it, I just can't believe it." Neither could many other people. The boys seemed just ordinary American boys. And people wondered, when the prosecutor asked during the trial: "What sort of creatures are these?" More than one parent eyed his own teen-age boy with new misgivings. As one man said: "There but for the grace of God goes my own son."
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> Every now and then teen-age youths of good background and unquestioned sanity commit a murder for no apparent reason. Each time the same questions are asked—what sort of creatures are these? and What should be done with them? and Why did they do it? But the questions receive no answers, at least not from the courts, whose proper scope is narrower. Let us study this murder and these murderers—the three boys, their parents, their childhoods, their schools, the teen-age world around them, the adult world they aspired to. Let us try to answer that most important and most difficult of all questions: Why? Why did they kill? Since we are wandering in that dark jungle termed human motivation we can expect no final answer. But perhaps by merely getting all the ascertainable facts out in the open, we can approach understanding. All is not, cannot be, darkness and mystification.

The darkness lifts a bit for Mr. Martin, and for his readers, as he studies the nature of our society—the interdependence between crime patterns among the young and what are often considered "normal" forms of adult behavior. "Since 1900," Martin writes, "America has been remade. Societies do not necessarily get better or worse; but they do change. Sometimes new controls do not arise to replace ones thrown off; sometimes enlightenment overthrows old taboos but erects falser idols in their places. Just as a psychotic is merely a human being in whom the normal balance has been disturbed, so is a delinquent society merely a distortion of all society, exaggerating its lawlessness and jettisoning its controls. Businessmen frequently are dishonest, though they shrink from murder. When youngsters drive fast and recklessly they are doing what the rest of us have learned is imprudent."

We are not here citing statistics and recounting a murder simply to "view with alarm." It seems to us, however, that a reading of Mr. Martin's book and William Bernard's *Jail Bait* (Greenburg and Popular Library, 1949) might cause us to wonder if we really do, after all, offer our youth a better environment than did Hitler's *Jugend*—an odd question, perhaps, but worth considering. While ourselves unable to stomach either authoritarian control or fanatical nationalism, we nevertheless hazard the guess that many American parents who discover their children "running wild"—as did Bill Morey and his crowd—would rather see them under a regime

like Hitler's, where they were at least healthier and apparently happier. If you think this supposition ridiculous, read Mr. Martin's book, then read *The House That Hitler Built*, with its description of the youth movement in Germany prior to the last war, and see if you can brush aside the question, no matter how much you deplore Hitlerian insanity. Many boys in the wayward gangs and crowds of American communities seem, if anything, more senselessly sadistic in their behavior than the Hitler youth, and, moreover, less able to feel any driving or guiding enthusiams.

The sort of enthusiasm which Hitler nourished, obviously, will not do the world any good, and the Hitler-youths who flourished under a regime which provided intense purpose for their activities, died out suddenly when "the house that Hitler built" collapsed. But we think there is one thing that can be learned from even the Jugend, and it is that the happiest and healthiest flowering of youth requires both intensive physical discipline and a general intensity of purpose or purposes. There seems to be something about the human being which either languishes and withers or becomes distorted and corrupt without a focus for intense effort. The young men and women in our wealthy society have every opportunity, but no driving aspirations. The acquisition of wealth, or position, even, no longer beckons. Everything is easily come by and the "leisure" society has become a society eroded by those psychological weaknesses which inevitably appear when no intensity of purpose is found or felt.

FRONTIERS

Revolutions of Civilization

IT was John W. Draper, author of the famous *Conflict Between Religion and Science* (1874) and the almost as well known *Intellectual Development of Europe* (1876), who first pointed out to the West that when the Arabian culture of Spain reached its height, the kings of France were still walking around on floors covered with straw.

We are moved to recall this interesting bit of information by an article in the August *Progressive*, "Primer on World Politics," by Leonard S. Kenworthy, who sketches briefly six leading facts about world population—the first being that most of the world lives in Asia. Specifically:

> Of the seven most populous countries in the world, six are in the East. First comes China with 464 million, then India with 358 million, followed by the U.S.S.R. with about 200 million, and the United States with 157 million. The next three are fairly close in the number of their inhabitants, but the most recent figures released by the UN give Japan 83 million, Pakistan 75 million, and Indonesia 74 million.
>
> Of these nations the United States is the only one definitely not in Asia. The U.S.S.R., of course, is partially in Europe and partly in Asia, but with more affinity for Asia than its Western neighbors.

(As a note to these statistics, it seems worth mentioning that the news magazines now tell us that practically all the allies of the United States now take the view that the "West" should attempt to come to some settlement with Communism, but that America still strongly opposes such moves, with the result that this country is becoming increasingly isolated.)

The rest of Mr. Kenworthy's facts follow in quick succession: (2) Most of the world is non-white; (3) most of the world is poor—the income of the average American is more than 25 times that of the average in South Asia, and nearly 50 times the average for Southeast Asia; (4) most of the world is ill-fed—probably two thirds of the world's population goes to bed hungry or undernourished each night; (5) most of the world is sick, mainly because the people do not have enough to eat and are poor; and (6) most of the world is illiterate.

As Kenworthy says, the implications to be drawn from these facts "are staggering and revolutionary." They reminded us, however, of a passage in Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe*, where the author describes what happened in eighth-century Spain after the Arabs had conquered the Gothic monarch, Roderic:

> Scarcely had the Arabs become firmly settled in Spain when they commenced a brilliant career. Adopting what had now become the established policy of the Commanders of the Faithful in Asia, the Emirs of Cordova distinguished themselves as patrons of learning and set an example of refinement strongly contrasting with the condition of the native European princes. Cordova, under their administration, at its highest point of prosperity, boasted of more than two hundred thousand houses, and more than a million of inhabitants. After sunset, a man might walk through it in a straight line for ten miles by the light of the public lamps. Seven hundred years after this time there was not so much as one public lamp in London. Its streets were solidly paved. In Paris, centuries subsequently, whoever stepped over his threshold on a rainy day stepped up to his ankles in mud. Other cities, as Granada, Seville, Toledo, considered themselves rivals of Cordova. The palaces of the Khalifs were magnificently decorated. These sovereigns might well look down with supercilious contempt on the dwellings of the rulers of Germany, France, and England, which were scarcely better than stables—chimneyless, windowless, and with a hole in the roof for the smoke to escape, like the wigwams of certain Indians. The Spanish Mohammedans had brought with them all the luxuries and prodigalities of Asia. Their residences stood forth against the clear blue sky, or were embosomed in woods. They had polished marble balconies, overhanging orange-gardens; courts with cascades of water; shady retreats provocative of slumber in the heat of the day; retiring-rooms vaulted with stained glass, speckled with gold, over which streams of water were made to rush, the floors and walls were of exquisite mosaic. Here, a fountain of quicksilver shot up in a glistening spray, the glittering particles falling with a tranquil sound like fairy bells; there, apartments into which cool air was drawn from the flower-gardens, in summer, by means of ventilating towers, and in winter through earthen pipes, or caleducts, imbedded in the walls—the hypocaust, in the vaults below, breathing forth volumes of warm and perfumed air through these hidden passages. . . .

The luster of Arabic culture is a favorite subject with Mr. Draper, and he goes on and on, noting the high achievements of these followers of the Prophet in literature, philosophy, and science. In the latter field, Laplace, he notes, adduces evidence from an Arabic

observer "as affording incontestable proof of the diminution of the eccentricity of the earth's orbit." After an impressive summary of the contributions of Arabian astronomers to studies of "the nature of the world," Draper comments: "Meanwhile, such was the benighted condition of Christendom, such its deplorable ignorance, that it cared nothing about the matter. Its attention was engrossed by image-worship, transubstantiation, the merits of the saints, miracles, shrine-cures."

It may be pointed out here that scholars since Draper's time have discovered that not only did the Arabs bring their "luxuries and prodigalities" from Asia, but that much of their science, also, had this origin. The famous "Arabic numerals," for example, originated in India, likewise the foundations of mathematics, including the notion of *zero,* which is vital to advanced computation.

"Benightedness," it appears, is little more than a matter of which century you happen to live in. From the present standards of the West, at any rate, a mere thousand or eleven hundred years ago, it was the West which was benighted, illiterate, ignorant, saturated with superstition, uninterested in the nature of the world—while Asia was a land of exquisite refinements and scientific and philosophical intelligence. It is true that Asia was ruled by despots, that cruelty was commonplace, but is the West entirely exempt from these defects today?

Mr. Kenworthy's facts reveal that among the nations subsisting on a diet below the minimum set for health by the World Health Organization are "Japan, Pakistan, IndoChina, India, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Chile, Colombia, and Italy." Is there any "cruelty" here? Kenworthy comments:

> It is exciting to think what might be accomplished if the United States and some of the other nations became concerned about the health of the world. It might radically alter our niggardly contribution to the World Health Organization, which was just under $3,000,000 in 1953. It might change our approach to the Point Four program. It might also alter the thinking of many people about medical missionaries in many parts of this globe.

Equally pertinent is this question:

> What would happen to our international relations with Africa or Southeast Asia or to our domestic policies regarding discrimination and segregation if the majority of U.S. citizens began to think of themselves as part of a racial minority in our contemporary world? Certainly there would be some radical readjustments at home and abroad.

The big-circulation magazines, however, are not devoting themselves to such questions. Rather the editors of such periodicals engage the attention of their readers with articles on how to defend yourselves—ourselves—against H-bombs, now that we know that the Russians have them, too.

There are plenty of these major and minor ironies to think about, but even more interesting reflections develop around the great, non-political revolutions of civilization: a thousand years ago Europeans living in wigwams, and Asiatics enjoying radiant heating—or something very close to it; today, almost a reversal of the situation. What about tomorrow?

The IQ testers have pretty well proved that race has practically nothing to do with intelligence; the scholars have shown that there is nothing especially superior about the white man's religion—in fact . . .; and the historians show that the dark races once surpassed their blond brethren in practically all the indicia of civilization. All that has really been added to the picture of the ups and downs of culture, so far as we can see, is things like H-bombs, which can hardly help matters, from a long-term view.

There is of course something else. There is the sensitive self-consciousness of modern man, and his awareness—or the awareness of a minority of modern men, not just in the West, but all over the globe that all men are brothers and must some day learn to act as brothers. This is our only hope.